collusion reports

Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Pat Finucane [extract]

A. DEFINITION OF COLLUSION

Although the definition of the term "Collusion" was set out
earlier in this report it may be helpful to repeat the
definition.

How should collusion be defined? Synonyms that are frequently
given for the verb to collude are these: to conspire; to connive;
to collaborate; to plot; and to scheme. The verb "connive" is
defined as to deliberately ignore; to overlook; to disregard; to
pass over; to take no notice of; to turn a blind eye; to wink; to
excuse; to condone; to look the other way; to let something ride;
see for example the Oxford Compact Thesaurus Second Edition 2001.

Similarly the Webster dictionary defines the verb collude in this
way: to connive with another: conspire, plot.

It defines the verb connive as follows:

1. to pretend ignorance or unawareness of something one ought
morally, or officially or legally to oppose; to fail to take
action against a known wrongdoing or misbehaviour - usually used
with connive at the violation of a law.

2.
(a) to be indulgent, tolerant or secretly in favour or sympathy;
(b) wink at youthful follies;
(c) to cooperate secretly: to have a secret understanding.

In the narrower context how should collusion be defined for the
purposes of this inquiry? At the outset it should be recognised
that members of the public must have confidence in the actions of
Governmental agencies, particularly those of the Army and the
police force. There cannot be public confidence in Government
agencies that are guilty of collusion in serious crimes. Because
of the necessity for public confidence in the Army, the Police,
and Security Services the definition of collusion must be
reasonably broad when it is applied to actions of these agencies.
This is to say that Army and police forces must not act
collusively by ignoring or turning a blind eye to the wrongful
acts of their servants or agents. Any lesser definition would
have the effect of condoning, or even encouraging, state
involvement in crimes, thereby shattering all public confidence
in these important agencies.

In determining whether there are indications of state collusion
in the murder of Patrick Finucane, it is important to look at the
issue from two perspectives. First, it must be seen whether the
documents indicate that the action or inaction of Government
agencies might have directly contributed to the killing of
Patrick Finucane by the UDA. Secondly it is necessary to examine
collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to the
killing, by generally facilitating the terrorist activities of
the UDA. That is, the evidence may reveal a pattern of behaviour
by a Government agency that comes within the definition of
collusion. This evidence may add to and form part of the
cumulative effect which emerges from a reading of the documents.
Both perspectives will be considered in determining whether the
evidence indicates that there have been acts of collusion by
Government agencies.



B. INSTANCES WHERE THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH
COLLUSION

Before reviewing those state actions that do, in my view,
constitute collusion, it may be helpful to refer to two other
matters which have been brought to my attention. Quite simply,
the documentary evidence that I have reviewed does not support
either of the allegations.

i. Vehicle check point and search operation

In February 1999, the group British Irish Rights Watch alleged
that the termination and removal of vehicle check points in the
vicinity of the Finucane home prior to the murder was a collusive
action taken to facilitate the murder.

A similar allegation has been advanced in a written brief
submitted to this Inquiry I have reviewed is a statement taken
from Soldier BBB on 21 June 2000. He stated that, in direct
response to this allegation, he conducted a careful review of all
army logs pertaining to vehicle check points and garage searches
in the neighbourhood of the Finucane home on the day of the
shooting. Vehicle searches were generally carried out in the
daytime and suspended when it became dark. This general rule was
adhered to on 12 February 1989. The army had received information
that mortar bombs might be hidden in the area close to the
Finucane home. As a result, a search of nearby garages was
carried out, but when nothing was found, the search was called
off.

There is no evidence in the documents that the suspension of
either the garage searches or the vehicle searches close to the
Finucane home was a sinister or collusive act.

However, in the Panorama program "Licence to Kill: Part I",
broadcast 11 July 2002, Loyalist D is reported to have stated
that an RUC policeman, who had earlier encouraged him to shoot
Patrick Finucane, called him to say that the road block had been
taken down.

The question of whether such a call was made, by whom, its
contents, and the surrounding circumstances is something that a
public inquiry might wish to explore.

ii. Was there an RUC officer in the [company name redacted] taxi?

In a written submission to this inquiry, a suggestion was made
that there was evidence that an officer from the RUC was a member
of the group that hijacked the [company name redacted] taxi a
short time before the murder. There is no documentary evidence or
statement which supports this allegation. Whether a public
inquiry should nonetheless wish to explore this question is not a
matter for me to comment upon.



C. SUMMARY OF COLLUSIVE ACTS

Bearing in mind the definition of collusion, it may be helpful to
set out in summary form those state actions which could be deemed
collusive Like all condensations it suffers from the effects of
compression and displays all the symptoms of a case of the bends.
It should only be considered in the context of the relevant
sections of the complete report.


i. FRU

The following matters are relevant in considering whether FRU
engaged in collusive acts:

a. Did FRU have advance knowledge that Patrick Finucane was being
targeted by the UDA?

The documents clearly raise questions as to whether or not FRU
knew, in advance, that the UDA was planning to target and kill
Patrick Finucane. There are conflicts in the documentary evidence
that can only be resolved at a public hearing. On the one hand,
Brian Nelson insists in his 1990 statement, and his written
account recovered from Stormont, that he told his handlers about
the events leading up to the murder on 12 February 1989. While
Nelson recanted certain statements in 1993, he nonetheless
maintained that he had told his handlers about UDA plans to kill
a PIRA solicitor. On the other hand, the handlers, in their
statements, deny that Nelson told them about Patrick Finucane
before the shooting on 12 February 1989. Moreover, there are no
CFs or TCFs recording any such information prior to 13 February
1989. The resolution of this conflict requires findings of
credibility, which I am not in a position to make. I do, however,
note the following matters which may lend support to Nelson's
assertions:

i. On 13 February 1989, the morning after the murder, Nelson
telephoned his handler and said: "It was ours this morning". From
this cryptic comment, the handler was able to divine, with
apparent certainty, that Nelson was referring to the murder of
Patrick Finucane the night before. This might suggest that the
handler did have some background information, and that the
telephone call on the 13th was not the first time the Patrick
Finucane case was discussed.

ii. The conversation that Nelson is said to have had with
Loyalist J 6-8 weeks before the murder, in which Loyalist J
identified Patrick Finucane as a target and asked Nelson to
obtain information, is the very sort of conversation that was
routinely reported by Nelson to his handlers.

iii. Just 6 days before the murder, Nelson's handlers were aware
that he was "initiating most of the targeting" for the UDA. There
is every reason to believe that Nelson would have been aware of
the plot to murder Patrick Finucane and that he may have had some
involvement in it. I note that William Stobie, an SB agent, told
a journalist that Nelson was present at a meeting where the
details of the assassination were discussed.

iv. At a time prior to the Patrick Finucane murder, Nelson was
under considerable pressure from the UDA to provide reliable
targeting information. He was being criticized for operations
that had gone awry, and therefore had an incentive to mount a
targeting campaign that had a reasonable prospect of success.

v. Nelson was also, at this time, under pressure from his FRU
handlers, who had become increasingly dissatisfied with his
intelligence information. As a result, Nelson had an incentive to
report the targeting of Patrick Finucane to his handlers,
particularly because he was aware that Patrick Finucane was a
"hot target".

vi. Following the murder, Nelson did report to his handlers that
he had provided the photograph of Patrick Finucane and Target I
to Loyalist J. In his statements, Nelson asserted his belief that
he would get into trouble with his handlers for his role in the
Patrick Finucane affair. Yet, there are no CFs or TCFs that
record any criticism of Nelson by his handlers. It could be
inferred that, if Nelson had, in fact, failed to report the
targeting of Patrick Finucane in a timely fashion, this would
have generated some adverse comment by FRU.

If Nelson is correct in stating that he told his handlers that
Patrick Finucane was a target, and no steps were taken by FRU to
either warn Patrick Finucane or otherwise intervene, then that
would be capable of constituting a collusive act. This follows,
as it would mean that FRU had turned a blind eye to the threat
against Patrick Finucane, notwithstanding that the information
came from someone that they considered to be an outstanding
agent. Only a public inquiry can determine whether this occurred.
The evidence I have seen warrants the holding of a public inquiry
on this issue.

b. Passing of information to Nelson by handlers

The CFs and TCFs - the records kept in the usual and ordinary
course of the business of FRU - leave little doubt that, on
occasion, handlers provided information to Nelson that
facilitated his targeting activities. While there is no
indication that handlers provided information that specifically
pertained to Patrick Finucane, this breach of policy is
significant, as it demonstrates a general pattern of behaviour on
the part of Nelson's handlers that could be considered collusive.
They were aware that Nelson was a central player within the UDA,
and that he had considerable influence in directing targeting
operations. They were also aware that Nelson often played a
direct and active role in reconnaissance missions. The provision
of information to Nelson in these circumstances may be seen as
evidence of collusive behaviour that had the potential to
facilitate the deadly operations planned by the UDA.

c. Failure to restrain Nelson's criminal activities

There can be no doubt that Nelson, by his own admission,
committed criminal acts. He entered pleas of guilty to 20
terrorist related crimes, including five separate instances of
conspiracy to murder. Even more importantly, the CFs and TCFs
reveal that the army handlers were aware, or at the very least,
most certainly ought to have been aware, of the criminal acts of
Nelson. Little or no effort was taken to prohibit or discourage
Nelson from committing criminal acts. It is apparent from some of
the CFs that the handlers were more concerned with Nelson's
security, and avoiding police detection, than they were with
stopping his criminal activity. The documents I have examined
disclose that Army handlers and their superiors turned a blind
eye to the criminal acts of Nelson. In doing this they
established a pattern of behaviour that could be characterized as
collusive.

d. Evidence given at Nelson's trial

The evidence given by the CO FRU, (Soldier "J"), at Nelson's
trial could only be described as misleading. The statement that
Nelson's actions were responsible for saving close to 217 lives
was based on a highly dubious numerical analysis that cannot be
supported on any basis. The troubling evidence given at Nelson's
trial, coupled with FRU's knowledge of his criminal activities,
is part of the cumulative picture that should be examined in
determining whether FRU acted collusively in the murder of
Patrick Finucane. e. FRU collusion

The documents either in themselves or taken cumulatively can be
taken to indicate that FRU committed acts of collusion. Further,
there is strong if, in some instances, conflicting documentary
evidence that FRU committed collusive acts. Only a public inquiry
can resolve the conflict.


ii. The Security Service

Much of the work of the Security Service is not relevant to my
inquiry. However, the agent operations that the Security Service
ran in Northern Ireland did give rise to conduct that appears to
fall within the definition of collusion.

a. In 1981, the Security Service was aware that the UDA had plans
to kill Patrick Finucane and that the threat was both very real
and very imminent. After consultation with Security Service
officers from the Joint Security Service/SIS section present, RUC
SB decided to take no steps to intervene or halt the attack.

b. In 1985, the Security Service was aware that a leading
loyalist paramilitary considered Patrick Finucane to be a
priority target.

c. In December 1988, just seven weeks before the murder, the
Security Service received information from an agent that there
were plans afoot to kill various targets, and that the UDA had
singled out Patrick Finucane for special attention. Once again,
no action was taken to warn Patrick Finucane or to intervene in
any way.

The apparent failure of the Security Service to suggest to RUC SB
that action should be taken on these threats might, itself, be
capable of constituting collusive action. At the very least,
these matters add to the cumulative pattern of conduct
demonstrated by the relevant Government agencies and should be
considered in the context of a public inquiry.


iii. RUC Special Branch

In my view, the following conduct of the RUC SB is directly
relevant to the question of collusion:

a. Failure to Act on Known Threats: In 1981, no action had been
taken in connection with a direct threat against Patrick
Finucane. Rather, the protection of agent security was seen as
more important than saving the life of a person who faced a
serious and imminent threat. Similarly through its agent, William
Stobie, RUC SB was aware that, just 5 days before the Finucane
murder, a top UDA official had asked Stobie to provide a 9 mm
Browning pistol for a "hit on a top PIRA man". This information
was not apparently pursued.

b. Failure to Follow up on the Browning Pistol: Just three days
after the murder, Stobie reported that he had been asked by the
same UDA official to pick up and hide a 9mm Browning. No steps
were taken to recover or trace this weapon, although there was
every reason to believe that it was the firearm used to kill
Patrick Finucane.

The failure to act on information received in 1989, both before
and after the Finucane murder, is indicative of collusion and
should be the subject of inquiry at a public hearing.

c. The Intelligence and Threats Books: As a general rule, the
intelligence and threats books reveal that RUC SB failed to
record or act upon intelligence information coming from FRU.
Similarly, they indicate that SB rarely took any steps to
document threats or prevent attacks by the UDA, whereas
pro-active steps were routinely taken in connection with PIRA and
other Republican threats. The failure to issue warnings to
persons targeted by the UDA often led to tragic consequences.
This is indicative of attitudes within RUC SB. It also
constitutes a pattern of conduct that could be equated with
collusive behaviour.

d. [censored by British government]

e. Withholding information from the investigating officer: The
failure by the RUC Special Branch to report to DS [name redacted
- Officer H], the senior officer investigating the murder of
Patrick Finucane, any information concerning the role of Nelson
in FRU, and the role of Stobie in RUC SB, did much to frustrate
his investigation. RUC SB knew, or certainly ought to have
known, that this information was necessary if a proper
investigation of the murder were to be conducted. This too could
be found to be a collusive act.

CONCLUSION

Some of the acts summarized above are, in and of themselves,
capable of constituting acts of collusion. Further, the documents
and statements I have referred to in this review have a
cumulative effect. Considered together, they clearly indicate to
me that there is strong evidence that collusive acts were
committed by the Army (FRU), the RUC SB and the Security Service.
I am satisfied that there is a need for a public inquiry.


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>>>>>> Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Robert Hamill [extract]


A. DEFINITION OF COLLUSION


In the narrower context how should collusion be defined for the
purposes of the Robert Hamill case? At the outset it should be
recognised that members of the public must have confidence in the
actions of Governmental agencies, particularly those of the
police force. There cannot be public confidence in a Government
agency that is guilty of collusion or connivance in serious
crimes. Because of the necessity for public confidence in the
police, the definition of collusion must be reasonably broad when
it is applied to police actions. This is to say that police
forces must not act collusively by ignoring or turning a blind
eye to the wrongful acts of their officers or of their servants
or agents. Nor can the police act collusively by supplying
information to assist those committing wrongful acts or by
encouraging them to commit wrongful acts. Any lesser definition
would have the effect of condoning, or even encouraging, state
involvement in crimes, thereby shattering all public confidence
in important Government agencies. This case is unique in that it
will turn on whether or not police officers, by assisting or
counselling the Protestant rioters or by turning a blind eye to
their misconduct, acted in a collusive manner.

In determining whether there are indications of state collusion
in the murder of Robert Hamill, it is important to look at the
issue from two perspectives. First, it must be seen whether the
documents indicate that the action or inaction of the police
might have directly contributed to the killing of Robert Hamill
or hindered the investigation of his murder or perverted the
course of justice. In addition it is necessary to examine
collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to his
killing by the Protestant rioters on 27 April 1997 or frustrated
the investigation of his death. In this regard it is necessary to
examine collusive acts which may have indirectly contributed to
the killing by generally facilitating or encouraging or turning a
blind eye to the actions or behaviour of the Protestant rioters.
That is the evidence may reveal a pattern of behaviour by a
Government agency that comes within the definition of collusion.
This evidence may add to and form part of the cumulative effect
which emerges from a reading of the documents. Both perspectives
will be considered in determining whether the evidence indicates
that there have been acts of collusion by the police. However the
aspect of a direct contribution by the police will have a greater
significance in my consideration of what may constitute collusive
acts in this case.


B. IMPORTANCE OF THE POLICE FORCE TO THE COMMUNITY

The vital importance of the police force to the community as a
whole and to the administration of justice cannot be over
emphasised. The first contact members of a community have with
the justice system is through police officers. As members of the
justice system, police officers must act judiciously. They must
always strive to enforce and apply the law fairly, evenly,
without bias or discrimination. It can never be forgotten that
the role of the police is to serve and protect the entire
community not just one segment of it.

The report on the Finucane case referred to the role of the
police. Perhaps I can usefully quote three paragraphs from that
report.

"The role of the police requires great physical courage, absolute
integrity, patience, sensitivity, understanding, and firm
discipline both from the individual officer and from the police
force as a unit. To perform their duties in today's society
police officers must be both intelligent and highly trained. The
police must serve and protect all within their community without
regard to the colour of their skin, their religion or country of
origin. They must act without preference or bias.

The role of the police in a democratic society is of the highest
importance. They must exercise all the highest attributes of a
police force operating in the most despotic countries. Yet the
police in a democracy must go much further. They must recognise
that they are subject to the rule of law and always operate
within and under the rule of law, no matter how difficult and how
frustrating that may be. The police must serve and protect their
community but always in a manner that complies with the law. They
must protect their community and enforce its laws fairly and
without discrimination. Prejudices must be set aside and personal
preferences rejected. It is an extremely difficult role. Yet the
work of the police is of fundamental importance to their
community and country. It is the police who must serve as the
role model for all, standing as examples of disciplined courage
and fairness. Good police officers deserve the support,
recognition and admiration of their community.

... The present reformed police force, designated as The Police
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) , may serve as an example to
all the residents of Northern Ireland. It will demonstrate that
police officers, whether Catholic or Protestant can work well
together. I am sure that these officers will, in the course of
their work, display that requisite high degree of courage,
impartiality and fairness. The officers themselves will, with the
passage of time, learn that they can place their safety and their
lives in the hands of a partner of a different religion. From
this will develop confidence and trust in their fellow officers
and eventually friendship. This cooperation, trust and friendship
will truly serve as an example to all in Northern Ireland. This
may sound trite, overly optimistic and of only passing relevance
to this inquiry. Nonetheless I believe that it is important to
state for the benefit of both the Police Service of Northern
Ireland and the people they serve.

There is another aspect of police work that must be mentioned. As
I have said it is fundamentally important that the police serve
and protect the entire community not just one segment of it. It
is equally true that all segments of the community should
cooperate with the police. It is only with that cooperation that
the police will be able to provide the high degree of service and
protection that all communities deserve.

C. WHAT ACTIONS OF THE POLICE COULD CONSTITUTE COLLUSION

i. The conduct of Reserve Constable B

First and foremost the actions of Reserve Constable B, if
established, are capable of being found to constitute the most
flagrant type of collusion. His actions did not constitute the
simple turning of a blind eye. Rather they could be found to be
carefully planned and premeditated actions taken to frustrate a
murder investigation and to protect or to exonerate an individual
who might have been guilty of murder. The instruction to dispose
of Mr O's clothing was an invitation to destroy possible evidence
of participation in a murderous assault. If it is established,
this action in itself is a dangerous abuse of his position as a
police officer and could be found to constitute a flagrant and
deliberate act of collusion. Ever since Cain slew Abel, murder
has been considered by all societies to be the most serious of
crimes. Every democratic country expects a murder case to be
investigated fully, fairly, thoroughly and carefully. Yet the
actions of Reserve Constable B could be found to have frustrated
a full and careful police investigation of Robert Hamill's murder

It is true that Officer B has always denied making the call to
the O home shortly after 8.00am on the morning of 27 April. It is
obviously not for me to make findings of fact. However the
evidence referred to in the segment headed "Conspiracy to pervert
the course of justice: the conduct of Reserve Constable B" is of
such a worrisome nature that it, of itself, requires that there
be a public inquiry to resolve the issue. If the acts alleged
against Officer B are established then it could be found that he
deliberately committed a very serious and flagrant act of
collusion. If the clothes were destroyed then no forensic testing
of them could be carried out and a party to murder may have
avoided detection and identification with the deliberate
collaboration and assistance of a police officer. The
investigation of a murder may have been frustrated and the
administration of justice obstructed and perverted by the actions
of a police officer.

One might wonder why Officer B would take the step of phoning Mr
O's home to advise his parents to tell him to get rid of his
clothing if Officer B had not seen Mr O taking part in the
assault. If Mr O was never closer to the assault than ten yards
and took no part in it then there would be no need to be alarmed
about the condition of his clothing or what the testing of the
clothing might reveal.

If it was an innocent call or indeed one simply to advise the
parents that he had seen their son at the scene of a riot would
he take such pains to have a friend (Mr X) falsely state that he
was the one who had made the telephone call? The fabrication
involved the participation of another couple with all the
ramifications and possibilities of disclosure that this would
necessarily entail.

The questions raised by the actions alleged to have been taken by
Officer B to advise Mr O to get rid of his clothes are so serious
that they must be explored in a public inquiry. There is no other
way in which to restore public confidence in the PSNI. These
alleged actions of a very experienced Reserve Constable, in
themselves, warrant the holding of a public inquiry. Moreover it
may be that this act affected and permeated the approach of the
police to their entire investigation of the Robert Hamill murder.

There are other actions of Officer B that are worrisome. First
although he had known Mr O well for a number of years he never
mentioned him by name in his earlier statements. It is only in a
statement he gave in September 1997 that he first mentioned him
by name. Even then he referred to him only in a passing way and
indicated that Mr O was no longer active in the Tae Kwon Do club.
Yet he identified Mr O to Sergeant J so it is apparent that he
knew he was at the scene.


D. OTHER ASPECTS OF POLICE CONDUCT A PUBLIC INQUIRY MAY WISH TO
EXPLORE

There are other actions or inactions of the police which a public
inquiry may wish to explore. Let us assume that, when the police
were aware of fights taking place, they took all reasonable steps
to ensure that order was restored and that victims were
protected. Nonetheless the following serious questions still
remain.

* i. The warning of Mr V and the movement of the Land Rover

The first issue arises from the police reaction or failure to
react to Mr V's warning that others were on the way up from St
Patrick's Hall. At that moment the police were also aware that
there were others coming up from the bus stop at the bottom of
town. The rival groups of Protestants and Catholics were bound to
meet. The intersection was a flash point and the police must have
been aware that the emotions of both groups were well fuelled by
alcohol and could readily ignite.

Police records indicate that over the six months prior to 27
April, 17 incidents had occurred at this junction. In light of
this, was it reasonable to move the Land Rover to its third and
final position where the officers would have great difficulty
seeing those coming up Thomas Street from the Hall? Although
these actions may well be simply manifestations of an error in
judgment on the part of the police, they could also be found to
be collusive acts taken to assist the Protestant rioters. Only a
public inquiry could determine the issue.

* ii. What could be heard from inside the Land Rover?

There is conflicting evidence from the officers in the Land Rover
as to what could be heard. There can be little doubt that with
the vehicle closed up and the motor running it would be difficult
for the officers to hear what was being said outside. Yet
Constable D noted that he could hear shouting outside while
chatting with Mr R and Mr Q. In addition, Constable C could hear
yelling while the doors of the vehicle were shut and the engine
was running.

If the shouts and screams of Joanne and Siobhan Girvan could be
heard and were ignored that could constitute an act of collusion
that encouraged or aided the Protestant rioters by turning a
blind eye to their behaviour.

* iii. Why were the officers in the Land Rover unaware of the
identity of the members of the Protestant participants in the
riot?

It might be found significant that it was only one of the back up
officers who had no difficulty naming several of those present.
This was a small community, and many of the civilians seemed to
know the police. Was there a reluctance on the part of the police
to name those present? If this is established, this could be
found to amount to a collusive act that would assist the
Protestant rioters

* iv. Failure to seal off the scene and take blood and liquid
samples when the police were advised that the injuries to Robert
Hamill were life threatening.

The scene was not identified and sealed off until after 7.00am.
Forensic evidence was not collected until some hours, and in some
cases, days, later. It will be remembered that the hospital
phoned to advise of the gravity of Robert Hamill's injury about
4.35am. After that time this was no longer another minor Saturday
brawl. This was a case of a serious assault. From that moment the
scene should have been taped off and samples taken of the liquid,
(blood or alcohol), near the location of Hamill and Girvan. Steps
should have been taken to obtain the clothing of Robert Hamill
and those identified at the scene as taking part in the assault.
This may be the counsel of perfection. Yet the failure to take
these steps may indicate a bias in the police force that could
amount to institutional collusion.

* v. The release of Mr J

The public inquiry may wish to explore the reasons for Mr J's
release from the Land Rover even though someone at the scene told
Constable E that he was "one of the ones" who assaulted Robert
Hamill. Mr J was not arrested until 10 May 1997. Why was there
not a more timely follow-up on this suspect and evidence that
might be gathered from him? Once again this could be found to be
no more than an error in judgment or it could be found to be a
collusive act undertaken to assist the Protestant rioters.

* vi. Mrs X and her presence during the time that Witness "A"
gave her statement to the police

Witness "A" gave her statement to Detective Inspector S in the
presence of Mrs X. In that statement she related Mr O's account
of Officer B's phone calls. Mrs X said nothing to rebut or
contradict this account.

It was also Detective Inspector S who later took Mrs X's first
statement in which she asserted that it was her husband, rather
than Reserve Constable B, who called the Os at 8.37am on the
morning of 27 April. There is a clear discrepancy or conflict
between the statements of Witness "A" and Mrs X that should have
appeared obvious to the Inspector. Yet, this was not followed up,
and Mrs X's account, which exonerated Officer B, was simply
accepted. This is something that that a public inquiry might wish
to explore.

* vii. The failure to proceed with and follow up on tests of
blood and liquid found at the scene

The blood on the collar and back of Robert Hamill's jacket, and
bloodstains taken from the road at the junction of Thomas and
Market Street might have revealed relevant evidence, had they
been subject to proper forensic testing. These acts could be
found to be no more than errors in judgment, mistakes made in the
course of a very stressful incident or they could be found to be
collusive acts or omissions undertaken to assist the Protestant
rioters.


CUMULATIVE EFFECT

Perhaps taken individually some of the items set out under
headings i to vii could not be found to be acts of collusion.
However, taken in combination with each other and particularly
with the alleged acts of Officer B, they are capable of
supporting an inference of collusion. It is the cumulative effect
of all these matters which must be taken into account in reaching
a conclusion as to whether there is evidence of collusive acts
committed by the police. The cumulative effect of the issues
raised in headings i to vii combined with the alleged acts of
Officer B convince me that there is sufficient evidence of police
collusion to warrant the holding of a public inquiry.

As a result I must conclude that a Public inquiry should be held
to review the actions of the police during the period just prior
to the disturbance, during the course of the disturbance itself,
and during the subsequent investigation into the murder of Robert
Hamill.

I must note that this report has been completed without reference
to papers filed with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Agency
although they were requested some three months ago.

Apparently the agency obtained an opinion of counsel that the
papers should only be released to me if the consent of the
claimant or witnesses were obtained by the agency.

It would, of course, have been helpful to read that material.
However, I am satisfied that although it may have supported my
conclusions it would not change or vary them because they were
based on other documents. It is simply not worth the time and
expense involved to seek a judicial review of the decision to
refuse access to the material no matter what view I might take of
the legal opinion upon which it is based.


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>>>>>> Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Rosemary Nelson [extract]


CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO THE FAILURE TO PROTECT ROSEMARY NELSON


i. Introduction

I am satisfied that there is evidence of collusion by
Governmental Agencies in the murder of Rosemary Nelson that
warrants holding a public inquiry.

For ease of reference, I will reproduce the definition of
collusion that was stated earlier in this Report, and that I have
applied in the Rosemary Nelson case.


ii. Definition of collusion

[as for Finucane report]

How should collusion be defined for the purposes of this inquiry?
Again it is essential that I observe that members of the public
must have confidence in the actions of Government agencies
whether they be the NIO, the Secretary of State or the police
force. There cannot be public confidence in any Government agency
that is guilty of collusion or connivance with regard to serious
crimes. Because of the necessity for public confidence in the
Government agencies, the definition of collusion must be
reasonably broad when it is applied to these agencies. That is to
say that they must not act collusively by ignoring or turning a
blind eye to the wrongful acts of their servants or agents by
supplying information to assist those servants or agents in their
wrongful acts or by encouraging others to commit a wrongful act.

Any lesser definition would have the effect of condoning or even
encouraging state involvement in crimes, thus shattering all
public confidence in governmental agencies.

In determining whether there are indications of state collusion
in the murder of Rosemary Nelson it is important to look at the
issue from two perspectives. First it must be seen whether the
documents indicate that the action or inaction of the government
agencies might have directly contributed to the killing of
Rosemary Nelson. Secondly it is necessary to examine collusive
acts which may have indirectly contributed to the killing by
generally facilitating terrorist activities. That is the evidence
may reveal a pattern of behaviour by a Government agency that
comes within the definition of collusion. This evidence may add
to and form part of the cumulative effect which emerges from a
reading of the documents. In this case it will be important to
consider whether the documents reveal that Government agents or
government agencies turned a blind eye to threats which were
being made against the life of Rosemary Nelson. It must be
determined whether the failure of Government agencies to protect
Rosemary Nelson, in light of the threats that they were aware of,
constituted collusion. If the Government knew that Rosemary
Nelson's life was in danger, yet took no steps to ensure her
safety, this could constitute collusion. State sponsored
protection was available to individuals on a discretionary basis.
Obviously if this protection could have saved Rosemary Nelson's
life, the failure of Government officials to provide it was an
act or omission that could have facilitated her murder by
terrorist paramilitaries.

Further, if it is found that acts of Government encouraged
terrorist acts, this too could be found to be collusive action.


iii. State conduct that is capable of constituting collusion

The following is a summary of those acts and omissions on the
part of the RUC and NIO that are capable of giving rise to a
finding of collusion. As with all summaries, it suffers from the
effects of compression, and must be read together with the
document as a whole in order to be properly understood. This may
be somewhat repetitious but may provide a helpful outline.

(a) The RUC

(i) The alleged threats and demeaning remarks made by the RUC
officers while interrogating clients of Rosemary Nelson about
her, if they are found to have been made, are capable of
constituting collusion, both as evidence of turning a blind eye
to all threats made to her and as encouraging others to attack
her.

(ii) If the allegations of verbal and physical abuse to Rosemary
Nelson at Garvaghy Road are shown to be true, they too could
constitute evidence of collusion, both as to the turning a blind
eye to threats to her and as encouraging others to abuse and
threaten her.

(iii) If it is found that the RUC failed to properly investigate
the complaints regarding the alleged threatening remarks that
could constitute evidence of collusion both by turning a blind
eye to threats to her and by encouraging threats by others or by
indicating that they would be tolerated.

(iv) If it is found that the Chief Constable told Mr Cumaraswamy
that solicitors were working for paramilitary organisations that
could constitute evidence of collusion by encouraging others to
think of solicitors as being paramilitary members or terrorists
who could be treated as such.

RUC threat assessments

a. The RUC approach to the pamphlet "Man Without a Future" could
constitute evidence that it was turning a blind eye to the threat
it contained.

b. The RUC failure to follow up and obtain the 3 June death
threat letter which it knew had been referred to but was not
enclosed could certainly constitute collusion in that it was
turning a blind eye to the dangers besetting Rosemary Nelson.

c. The RUC failure to become aware of the same letter when it was
attached to Rosemary Nelson's statement to the Mulvihill inquiry
could be evidence of turning a blind eye to evidence regarding
the death threats to her.

d. The failure of the RUC to attach any weight to the heightened
danger to a solicitor taking high profile cases for Nationalists
could constitute turning a blind eye to a danger so clearly
demonstrated in the Finucane murder.

e. The failure of the RUC to give any weight to the letters from
reputable organisations concerned about her safety could
constitute turning a blind eye to the dangerous situation faced
by Rosemary Nelson and thus collusion.

(b) The NIO

(i) The failure of the NIO to take into account the letters from
reputable organisations which expressed concern for the safety of
Rosemary Nelson could be found to be a collusive act in that it
turned a blind eye to a dangerous situation.

(ii) The NIO relied upon the RUC threat assessment which it must
have or should have known did not take into account the death
threat letter of 3 June. This could well be found to constitute
the turning of a blind eye to the dangers faced by Rosemary
Nelson.

(iii) The NIO failed to ensure the 3 June death threat was
enclosed in its letter to the RUC. This could be found to be
carelessness amounting to turning a blind eye to the dangerous
situation.

(iv) It knew the conditions for qualification for protection
under the KPPS and thus the importance of the letter and yet took
no, or inadequate steps, to rectify the failure to enclose the
note. This could be found to constitute turning a blind eye.

(v) The NIO like the RUC could be found to have ignored the
threatening aspect of the "Man Without a Future" pamphlet. Thus,
the NIO could be found to have turned a blind eye to the
dangerous situation faced by Rosemary Nelson.

(vi) The NIO failed to offer Rosemary Nelson protection under its
own protection scheme although it was aware or should have been
aware of the dangers to her. This too could be found to be
turning a blind eye.

Following the murder

a. Both the NIO and the RUC denied that they were aware of any
specific threat to Rosemary Nelson although both were aware or
should have been aware of alleged threatening incidents, the
pamphlet and the death threat letter.

b. Similarly the NIO were prepared to take the position there was
no record that the GRRC had requested protection for Rosemary
Nelson when it knew or ought to have known that a request had
been made at the meeting.

Although these actions after the murder cannot standing alone
constitute collusive acts, they may be seen as a part of a
cumulative pattern of conduct which could be found to be
collusive.


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>>>>>> Abbreviations used


ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff
ASP Assistant Secretary Political
BIRW British Irish Rights Watch
CAJ Committee for the Administration of Justice
CC Chief Constable
CF Contact Form
CID Criminal Investigation Division
CLF Commander Land Forces
CO Commanding Officer
CQAs Close quarter attacks
DC Detective Constable
DCI Detective Chief Inspector
DCI Director and Controller of Intelligence
DHSB Deputy Head of Special Branch
DI Detective Inspector
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions
DS Detective Sergeant
FRU Force Research Unit
GOC NI General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland
GRRC Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition
H&K Heckler & Koch
HMG Her Majesty's Government
HSB Head of Special Branch
ICPC Independent Commission for Police Complaints
INLA Irish National Liberation Army
Intell Intelligence dump
IPLO Irish Peoples Liberation Organisation
IRA Irish Republican Army
KPPS Key Persons Protection Scheme
LVF Loyalist Volunteer Force
MISR Military Intelligence Source Report
NIO Northern Ireland Office
"P" cards Personality Cards
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
PPW Personal Protection Weapon
Provo Provisional
PS/Sec B&L Private Secretary/Secretary of State (Belfast and London)
PSF Provisional Sein Fein
PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland
PUS Permanent Under Secretary
RIR Royal Irish Regiment
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary
SASU Special Active Service Unit
SB Special Branch
SMG Sub machine gun
Sos Solicitors
SS Security Services
TCF Telephone Contact Form
TCGs Tasking and Co-ordination Groups
UDA Ulster Defence Association
UDR Ulster Defence Regiment
UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters
UVF Ulster Volunteer Force
WERC Weapons and Explosives Research Centre